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1. Introduction 
One of the main reasons behind the concurrent increase in the demand for and congestion of 
Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum is the rapid development of radio networks of all kinds in 
our world, which has defiantly changed the public feeling about radio. Nowadays, almost 
everybody has a mobile phone and radio stations are literary everywhere. Someone can 
argue that our world is becoming a radio world where waves are weaving everywhere 
around the Earth. What’s more, this congestion has created a battle between the public, 
private and military sectors over frequency ownership and has put a premium on the cost of 
spectrum. According to a recent research introduced by the FCC (Federal Communications 
Commission) and Ofcom, it was found that most of the frequency spectrum was inefficiently 
utilized [1-2]. The existing spectrum allocation process, denoted as Fixed Spectrum Access 
(FSA), headed for static long-term exclusive rights of spectrum usage [3] and shown to be 
inflexible [4]. Studies have shown, however, that spectral utilization is relatively low when 
examined not just by frequency domain, but also across the spatial and temporal domains 
[5]. Thus, an intelligent device aware of its surroundings and able to adapt to the existing RF 
environment in consideration of all three domains, may be able to utilize spectrum more 
efficiently by dynamically sharing spectral resources [6 and 7]. Since the 19th century, when 
the laws of electromagnetic have been discovered and described by the set of Maxwell’s 
equations and technical devices been invented to produce and use these electromagnetic 
waves predicted by theory, man has added his own man-made waves to the natural ones 
[7]. 
It is fair to say that, from the very beginning of wireless telephony, maritime radio systems 
has always used shared channels [7-8]. For example, 2,182 KHz is used as a calling 
frequency as well as emergency signalling frequency and other frequencies are used as 
working frequencies. If two ships want to communicate, one should identify a working 
frequency and make a call. By specifying a channel or channels, that ships keep watch on, 
both emergency and establishing connections between ships can be facilitative. In fact, 
channel sharing was necessary and effective because of the lack of sufficient channels 
offered to every single ship and due to the fact that, the typical ship will require far less than 
a full channel of capacity [7-8]. Around the mid of 1970’s, the FCC permitted land mobile 
operation on some of the lower UHF channels in several large cities, in order to expand land 
mobile services. One group of channels was made available to Radio Common Carriers 
(RCCs) to provide mobile service on a common carrier basis. The FCC adopted rules 
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permitting open entry for these channels and requiring carriers to monitor the channels and 
select unused channel to carry each conversation. In essence, exclusivity was provided on a 
first come, first-served basis one conversation at a time [7-9]. 
Another example of spectrum sharing is the second generation of cordless telephone (CT2), 
developed by the British industry and government in the mid of 1980’s. CT2 was designed 
to be used in both in home and in public and uses a pool of 40 channels. To establish a call, 
any equipment will automatically identify a vacant channel or a channel with the minimum 
interference and begins operation on that channel [7-8]. No one can ignore one of the main 
advantages of the radio, it can be used anywhere, at any time, capable of building links at 
very short distances as well as on a cosmic scale. Radio is a unique tool to connect men and 
things without any material medium. It is a wonderful tool for social progress. Having said 
all these facts about spectrum sharing, spectrum management can now be seen as a major 
goal for telecommunications efficiency. It is necessary that this natural and public resource 
be utilized for the profit of as many users as possible, taking care of the largest variety of 
needs.  
If we want to talk about Cognitive Radio (CR), then we must mention Software Defined 
Radio (SDR), which is a transmitter in which operating parameters including transmission 
frequency, modulation type and maximum radiated or conducted output power can be 
altered without making any hardware changes. The sophistication possible in an SDR has 
now reached the level where a radio can possibly perform beneficial tasks that help the user, 
the network and help to minimize spectral congestion [7]. In order to raise an SDR’s 
capabilities to make it known as a CR, it must support three major applications [7]: 
Spectrum management and optimization. 
Interface with a wide range of wireless networks leading to management and optimization 
of network resources. 
Interface with human providing electromagnetic resources to aid the human in his and/or 
her activates.  
We must begin with a few of the major contributions that have led us to today’s CR 
developments, to truly recognize how many technologies have come together to drive CR 
technologies. The development of Digital Signal Processing (DSP) technologies arose due to 
the efforts of the research leaders [10-14], who taught an entire industry how to convert 
analog signal processes to digital processes. In the meantime, the simulation industry used 
in the radio industry was not only practical, but also resulted in improved radio 
communication performance, reliability, flexibility and increased value to the user [15-18].  
The concept of CR emerged as an extension of SDR technology.  Although, definitions of the 
two technology’s are different, most radio expert agree with the fact that a CR device must 
have the following characteristic in order to be distinguished from an SDR one: 
1.     The named device should be aware of its environment. 
2. The device must be able to change its physical behaviour in order to adapt to the 
changes of its current environment. 
3.     The device must be able to learn from its previous experience. 
4. Finally, the device should be able to deal with situations unknown at the time of the 
device design. In another word, the device should be able to deal with any unexpected 
situations. 
That being said, up to the authors knowledge, the idea of CR was first discussed officially in 
1999 by [19]. It was a novel approach in wireless communications that the author describes 
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it as “The point in which wireless personal digital assistants (PDA’s) and the related 
networks are sufficiently computationally intelligent about radio resources and related 
computer-to-computer communications to detect user communications needs as a function 
of use context, and to provide radio resources and wireless services most appropriate to 
those needs.” [19]. What’s more, the work introduced in [19] can be considered one of the 
novel ideas which discussed CR technology. The work was based on the situation in which 
wireless nodes and the related networks are sufficiently computationally intelligent about 
radio resources and related computer-to-computer communication to detect the user 
communication needs as a function of use context and to provide resources and wireless 
resources most required. In another word, a CR is a radio that has the ability to sense and 
adapt to its radio environments. This work defined two basic characteristics of any CR 
device, which are cognitive capability and re-configurability. In order for the device to 
detect the spectrum parameters, the device should be able to interact with its environment. 
The spectrum needs to be analysed for spectrum concentration, power level, extent and 
nature of temporal and spatial variations, modulation scheme and existence of any other 
network operating in the neighbourhood. The CR device should be capable to adopt itself to 
meet the spectrum needs in the most optional method. The recent developments in the 
concept of software radios DSP techniques and antenna technology helped in this flexibility 
in CR devices design.   
Finally, the intelligent support of CR’s to the user arises by sophisticated networking of 
many radios to achieve the end behaviour, which provides added capability and other 
benefits to the user. 
2. Game theory and spectrum sharing 
Players in cooperative games try to maximize the overall profit function of everyone in the 
game in a fair fashion. This type of games has the advantage of higher total profit and better 
fairness. On the other hand, in non-cooperative or competitive games players try to 
maximize their own individual payoff functions. If such a game has a designer with 
preferences on the outcomes, it may be possible for the designer to decide on strategy spaces 
and the corresponding outcomes (i.e. the mechanism) so that the players' strategic behavior 
will not lead to an outcome that is far from desirable [20 and 21]. Recent studies have shown 
that despite claims of spectral insufficiency, the actual licensed spectrum remains 
unoccupied for long periods of time [8]. Thus, cognitive radio systems have been proposed 
[22] in order to efficiently exploit these spectral holes. 
Previous studies have tackled different aspects of spectrum sensing and spectrum access. In 
[23], the performance of spectrum sensing, in terms of throughput, is investigated when the 
secondary users (SUs) share their instantaneous knowledge of the channel. The work in [24] 
studies the performance of different detectors for spectrum sensing, while in [25] spatial 
diversity methods are proposed for improving the probability of detecting the Primary User 
(PU) by the SUs. Other aspects of spectrum sensing are discussed in [26-27]. Furthermore, 
spectrum access has also received increased attention, e.g. [28-34]. In [28], a dynamic 
programming approach is proposed to allow the SUs to maximize their channel access time 
while taking into account a penalty factor from any collision with the PU. The work in [30] 
and [35-44] establishes that, in practice, the sensing time of CR networks is large and affects 
the access performance of the SUs. In [29], the authors model the spectrum access problem 
as a non-cooperative game, and propose learning algorithms to find the correlated equilibria 
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of the game. Non-cooperative solutions for dynamic spectrum access are also proposed in 
[30] while taking into account changes in the SUs’ environment such as the arrival of new 
PUs, among others. 
Auctions of divisible goods have also received much attention [32] and [45-50]. Where the 
authors address the problem of allocating a divisible resource to buyers who value the 
quantity they receive, but strategize to maximize their net payoff (i.e. value minus payment). 
An allocation mechanism is used to allocate the resource based on bids declared by the 
buyers. The bids are equal to the payments, and the buyers are assumed to be in Nash 
equilibrium. When multiple SUs compete for spectral opportunities, the issues of fairness and 
efficiency arise. On one hand, it is desirable for an SU to access a channel with high 
availability. On the other hand, the effective achievable rate of an SU decreases when 
contending with many SUs over the most available channel. Consequently, efficiency of 
spectrum utilization in the system reduces. Therefore, an SU should explore transmission 
opportunities in other channels if available and refrain from transmission in the same 
channel all the time. Intuitively, diversifying spectrum access in both frequency (exploring 
more channels) and time (refraining from continuous transmission attempts) would be 
beneficial to achieving fairness among multiple SUs, in that SUs experiencing poorer 
channel conditions are not starved in the long run. 
The objective of the work in this chapter is to design a mechanism that enables fair and 
efficient sharing of spectral resources among SUs. Firstly, we model spectrum access in 
cognitive radio networks as a repeated cooperative game. The theory and realization of 
cooperative spectrum sharing is presented in detail, where we assume that there is one PU 
and several SUs. We also consider the case of dynamic games, where the number of SUs 
changes. The advantages of cooperative sharing are proved by simulation. Secondly, we 
discuss the case of large number of SUs competing to share the offered spectrum and how 
the cooperative game will reduce the sellers and bidders revenue. Finally, we introduce a 
competitive auction and game-based mechanism to improve the overall system efficiency in 
terms of a better fairness in accessing the spectrum. 
Throughout this chapter, an adaptive competitive second-price pay-to-bid sealed auction 
game is adapted as solution to the fairness problem of spectrum sharing between one 
primary user and a large number of secondary users in cognitive radio environment. Three 
main spectrum sharing game models are compared, namely optimal, cooperative and 
competitive game models introduced as a solution to the named problem. In addition, this 
chapter prove that the cooperative game model is built based on achieving Nash 
equilibrium between players and provides better revenue to the sellers and bidders in the 
game. Furthermore, the cooperative game is the best model to choose when the number of 
secondary users changes dynamically, but only when the number of competitors is low. As 
in practical situations, the number of secondary users might increase dramatically and the 
cooperative game will lose its powerful advantage once that number increases. As a result, 
the proposed mechanism creates a competition between the bidders and offers better 
revenue to the players in terms of fairness. Combining both second-price pay-to-bid sealed 
auction and competitive game model will insure that the user with better channel quality, 
higher traffic priority and fair bid will get a better chance to share the offered spectrum. It is 
shown by numerical results that the proposed mechanism could reach the maximum total 
profit for SUs with better fairness. Another solution is introduced in this chapter, which is 
done by introducing a reputation-based game between SUs. The game aims to elect one of 
the SUs to be a secondary-PU and arrange the access to other SUs. It is shown by numerical 
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results that the proposed game managed to give a better chance to SUs to use the spectrum 
more efficiently and improve the PU revenue. 
3. Assumptions and system model 
3.1 PU’s and SU’s and allocation function 
In the following sections, we consider a spectrum overlay-based cognitive radio wireless 
system with one PU and N SU’s (as shown in Figure 6-1). The PU is willing to share some 
portion (bi) of the free spectrum (F) with SU i. The PU asks each SU a payment of c per unit 
bandwidth for the spectrum share, where c is a function of the total size of spectrum 
available for sharing by the SU’s. The revenue of SU i is denoted by ri per unit of achievable 
transmission rate. A simple example is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. System model for spectrum sharing. 
Both centralized and distributed decision making scenarios are considers in this work. In the 
former case, each SU is assumed to be able to observe the strategies adopted by other users 
(i.e., either the users have the ability to discuss their shares between them, or the PU sends 
update of each SU share). In the latter case, the adaptation for spectrum sharing is performed 
in a distributed fashion based on communication between each of the SUs and the PU only 
(i.e., the secondary users are unable to observe the strategies and payoffs of each other). 
3.2 Cost function, and wireless system model 
A wireless transmission model based on adaptive modulation and coding (AMC) where the 
transmission rate can be dynamically adjusted based on channel quality is to be assumed in 
this chapter. With AMC, the signal-to-interference noise ratio (SINR) at the receiver is 
denoted as γ and equals to; 
 
0
i ij
j i i ij
p h
n p h
γ
≠
= + Σ  (1) 
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Where hij is the channel gain from the user j’s transmitter to user i’s receiver, pi is the 
transmitting power of the user i, and n0 is the thermal noise level. The rate for user i (in 
bits/sec/Hz) is given by; 
 Ri=log2(1+γ)  (2) 
The spectral efficiency Is of transmission by a secondary user can be obtained from [16]; 
 Is= log2(1+Kγ)  (3) 
Where k=1.5/ (ln0.2/BERtar), BERtar is the target bit-error-rate of the system. The pricing 
function [17] which the SU’s pay is given by; 
 c(F)= y(b1+b2+…+bn)z  (4) 
y and z are assumed to be positive constants and greater than one so that the function in 
convex (i.e., the function is continues and differentiable), knowing that B is the set of bids for 
all SU’s (i.e., B={b1, b2, …., bn}). Now let us denote w as the worth of the spectrum to the PU. 
Then, the condition c(F) > w × Σbj∈F bj  must be satisfied in order to ensure that the PU is 
willing to share spectrum of size b = Σbj∈F bidj with the SU’s (if it is equal, then PU will not 
gain any profit). 
The overall revenue of any SU can be explained as the combination of the user revenue of 
achievable transmission rate, the spectral efficiency and the shared portion of the spectrum 
(i.e., ri×Is×bi). While the cost the user must pay is bi× c(F). Then, the profit of every SU can be 
represented as; 
 µi= ri×Is×bi - bi× c(F)  (5) 
The marginal profit of SU i can be obtained from; 
 
1( ) ( ) ( )
j j
z zi
b F j b F jsi i
i
d F
b by yzbr I
db
μ −
∈ ∈Σ Σ= − −  (6) 
Knowing that, the optimal size of allocated spectrum to one SU depends on the strategies of 
other SU’s are using. Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution of the game to ensure 
that all SU’s are satisfied with it. By definition, Nash equilibrium of a game is a strategy 
profile with the property that no player can increase his payoff by choosing a different 
action, given the other players’ actions. In this case, the Nash equilibrium is obtained by 
using the best response function, which is the best strategy of one player given others’ 
strategies. Let ST-i denote the set of strategies adopted by all except SU i (i.e., ST-i = {stj |j=1, 
2, …, N; j≠i} and ST = ST-i ∪{sti}). The best response function of SU i given the size of the 
shared spectrum by other SU’s bj, where j≠ i, is defined as follows; 
 BRi=arg maxbi µi (ST-i ∪ {bi})  (7) 
Then the game is in Nash Equilibrium if and only if; 
 bi= BRi(ST-i), ∀i  (8) 
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4. Spectrum sharing strategies 
Cognitive radio is an intelligent wireless communication system that is aware of its 
surrounding environment and can be used to improve the efficiency of frequency spectrum 
by exploiting the existence of spectrum holes [22]. Spectrum management in cognitive radio 
aims at meeting the requirements from both the primary user and the secondary users. 
There are three strategies in spectrum sharing optimal, competitive and cooperative models. 
4.1 Optimal spectrum sharing model 
The objective of optimal model is to maximize the profit sum, which may make some 
secondary users have no spectrum to share [28, 32 and 51]. Therefore, it is unfair for all 
secondary users. From equation 6-6, the total marginal profit function for all the SU’s can be 
denoted as follows: 
1 ( ( ))
( )
N
j i
i
d F t
db t
μ=Σ
. 
In order to get the solution of the biggest profit for all the secondary users, an optimal 
equation is built, as (6-9); 
 Maximize: 1 ( )
N
j i Fμ=Σ   (9) 
Subject to:  bi ≥ 0, ∀ bi ∈ F 
Our assumption works as follow, the initial sharing spectrum is bi(0) for the SU i, which is 
sent to the primary user. The PU adjusts the pricing function c, and then it is sent back to the 
SU. Since all secondary users are rational to maximize their profits, they can adjust the size 
of the requested spectrum bi based on the marginal profit function. In this case, each 
secondary user can communicate with the primary user to obtain the differentiated pricing 
function for different strategies. The adjustment of the requested/allocated spectrum size 
can be modelled as a dynamic game [49] as follows: 
 
( )
( 1) ( ( )) ( ) ( )
( )
i
i i i i i
i
d F
b t f b t b t b t
db t
μη+ = = +   (10) 
Where bi(t) is the allocated spectrum size at time t to SU i and ǈi is the adjustment speed 
parameter (i.e., which can be expressed as the learning rate) of SU i. f(.) denotes the self-
mapping function. The SU can estimates the marginal profit function in the actual system by 
asking the price for share a spectrum from the PU of size bi(t) ±π, where π is a small number 
(i.e., π is 0.0001). Simply after that the SU observes the response price from the PU c-(.) and 
c+(.) for bi(t)-π and bi(t)+π , respectively. Then, the marginal profits for the two cases µi –(t) 
and µi +(t)are compared and the marginal profit can be estimated from; 
 
(.) (.) (.)
2
i i i
i
d
db
μ μ μ
π
+ −−=   (11) 
The overall optimal profit can be estimated using equation (9). 
4.2 Competitive spectrum sharing model 
The main objective of competitive model is to maximize the profits of individual SU’s by a 
game. The result is Nash equilibrium. In the distributed dynamic game, SU’s may only be able 
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to observe the pricing information from the PU; they cannot observe the strategies and 
profits of other SU’s. The Nash equilibrium for each SU is built based on the interaction with 
the PU, similar to the case of the optimal sharing model. Since all SU’s are rational to 
maximize their own profits, they can adjust the size of the requested spectrum bi based on 
the marginal profit function (i.e., equation (6)). In this case, each SU can communicate with 
the primary user to obtain different pricing function for different strategies. The adjustment 
of the requested/allocated spectrum size in competitive games show only a slight difference 
with optimal games, as each individual user is looking at improving his/her own profit. So 
equation (9) can be rewritten as; 
 Maximize: μi(F)  (12) 
Subject to:  bi ≥ 0, ∀ bi ∈ F  
In a similar way to the optimal game, an SU can estimate its marginal profit using the 
following equation: 
 { }( ( )) 1 ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
( ) 2
i
i i i i
i
d F t
F t F t
db t
μ μ π μ ππ= + − −   (13) 
When bi (t + 1) = bi (t) is satisfied, the Nash Equilibrium points (b0, b1, b2, …, bN) can be 
obtained. 
4.3 Cooperative spectrum sharing model 
As explained in previous section, in the model of competitive spectrum sharing, Nash 
equilibrium obtained at the maximum of the individual profit of SU. The result is not the best 
because they do not consider the interaction on other users. For cooperative spectrum 
sharing, the SU’s can communicate with the consideration on the behaviour to other users. 
In this chapter, we assume that players can reach in common by communicating with each 
other. Decreasing the size of sharing spectrum a little for all the SU’s on Nash equilibrium, 
(i.e., a factor ǔi (0 <ǔi < 1) is multiplied on each SU strategy of Nash equilibrium). Although the 
size of shared spectrum has decreased, the cost which the PU charges to the SU decreases 
too, which results in the increase of the overall profit for all SU’s and the total profits 
increase as well, but it might reduce the PU revenue. 
SU’s Nash Equilibrium strategy can be got from equation (10). All SU’s will negotiate and 
multiply ǔi, the cooperative strategy is obtained (i.e., ǔ1b1, ǔ2b2, ….., ǔNbN). ǔi is chosen in such 
a way that both the overall and individual profit is maximized, which we called as the 
cooperative state; 
 Maximize: 1 ( )
N
j i Fμ=Σ  and μi(F)  (14) 
Subject to:  bi ≥ 0, ∀ bi ∈ F 
However, we need to raise the problem of instability of this model. It is possible that one or 
more SUs may deviate from Nash equilibrium. For example, suppose u1 to be the first SU to 
share the spectrum and want to deviate, its profit may increase by setting its marginal profit 
function of equation (6) to zero. If another SU u2 does not change its strategy, the profit of u2 
will decrease. Therefore, any SU has the motive to deviate from cooperative state. In order 
to solve this problem, a mechanism needs to be applied to encourage the SUs not to deviate 
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from the Nash state by computing the long term profit of the SU. Suppose SU i is looking 
deviate from the Nash state, while SU j (j≠i) is still in the named state. Before SU i deviate, it 
will compute the long term profit. The mechanism will multiply the future profit of SU i (if 
decided to deviate) with a weight εi (0 < εi <1), which would make the profit in future stages 
are not higher than that of the previous stages, which means that the current profit is more 
valuable than future stages.  
For any SU i, µiNs, µiN, µid denotes the profits of Nash state, Nash Equilibrium and deviation, 
respectively. There are two cases: one is that they all in Nash at all stages, no SU to deviate 
from the optimal solution, the long term profit of any SU i is shown in equation (15). The 
other case is that SU i deviates from the optimal solution at the first stage, it will be in Nash 
equilibrium state in the following stages, and the long term profit of SU i is shown in 
equation (16). 
 2
1
...
1
Ns Ns Ns
i i i i i i
i
μ σ μ σ μ μσ+ + + = −   (15) 
 2 ...
1
d N N d i
i i i i i i i
i
σμ σ μ σ μ μ μσ+ + + = + −   (16) 
The Nash state will be maintained if the long-term profit due to adopting the state is higher 
than that caused by deviation. 
1
1 1
d i
i i i
i i
σμ μ μσ σ> +− −  
i.e., 
 
d Ns
i i
i d N
i i
μ μσ μ μ
−≥ −   (17) 
From equation (15), we know that the Nash state will be kept because of low long term 
profit for the SU who wants to deviate. The weights ǔi are the vindictive factors to inhabit 
the motive of leaving the cooperative state. 
5. Dynamic cooperative model 
In reality, the number of SUs may change. Sometimes there are more secondary users to 
apply for the spectrum offered by the primary user, and sometimes the secondary users 
have finished the communication and drop out of the spectrum as it has taken up. For 
example, let us suppose that there are two SUs, which have been in Nash state. Now there is 
another (new) SU to apply for the offered spectrum. We assume that the PU has no more 
spectrums to share. This will lead us to one solution, which is that the two SUs should make 
some of their spectrums exist to the newcomer. 
During the process of reallocating, an adaptive method is applied with the following 
requirements. The total profit for all the SUs should be the biggest and it should be fair for 
the reallocation. Being prior users it is rational for them to have priority in spectrum 
allocation than those who comes later. In order to keep the total profit to maximum, those 
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with better channel quality could take up more spectrum space. Therefore, the SUs with 
better channel quality could stop spectrum retreating earlier than those with worse channel 
quality. When the SUs reach optimal solution, the fairness will not be as good as the three 
SUs getting into Nash state directly. The reason is that these SUs coming at different time do 
not have the same priorities. 
When SUs have finished the communication and exited the spectrum they had shared, an 
adaptive method is applied. A fixed part of the spectrum is allocated to the remaining SUs 
for each step. It is possible for SUs with better channel quality acquire more spectrum in 
order to make the total profit bigger. 
6. Simulation results 
6.1 Static game (two SU’s only in the game) 
In this section, we will consider a CR environment with one PU and two SUs sharing a 
frequency spectrum of 20MHz to 40MHz. The system has the following settings; for the 
pricing function, c(F), we use y=1 and z=1. The worth of spectrum for the PU is assumed to 
be one (i.e. w=1). The revenue of a SU per unit transmission rate is ri = 10, ∀i. The target 
average BER is BERtar = 10-4. The initial value is bi(0)= 2 . The adjustment speed parameter ǈi 
=0.09. The SNR for SUs u1 and u2 are denoted by γ1, γ2 where γ1 =11dB, γ2=12dB. 
6.1.1 Optimal and competitive models 
As explained in the previous section, the total profit is represented by µ(B) = µ1(B) + µ2(B) . 
In Figure 2, the total profits in optimal model arrived at its biggest value 228.7333 when (b1, 
b2) = (4.1, 15.6). 
The trajectories of optimal model and competitive model are shown in Figure 3, (with γ1 
=11dB, γ2=12dB), the initial value is (2, 2) for the two models. In competitive model, the  
 
 
Fig. 2. Total profit and spectrum share using optimal game. 
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Fig. 3. Optimal and Competitive games 
shared spectrum is determined by a game, where the two SUs have been in Nash equilibrium. 
In our simulation, the Nash equilibrium is at (14.2591, 24.1302). The sum of spectrum sharing 
is 11.3893 with the total profit of 228.2378. 
It can be seen that the total profit for optimal model is higher than that of competitive model 
obviously. But one SU has no spectrum sharing for the optimal model, which means the lack 
of fairness. The advantage of competitive model is fair with a lower profit sum. 
6.1.2 Cooperative spectrum sharing game 
Based on the Nash equilibrium, we set the weight ǔi in the range of [0.5, 1]. In order to keep 
the fairness, we assume | ǔ1 – ǔ2 | ≤ 1 to guarantee the size of sharing spectrum is similar for 
both two SUs. Two SUs got their Nash equilibrium at (18.2591, 19.1302). At σ1 =0.70, σ2 =0.80, 
the total profit of 234.4963. Compared with the competitive model, we found that the shared 
spectrum in cooperative model is less than that of competitive model; it has a bigger total 
profit than that of Nash equilibrium, as shown in Figure 3. 
The reason is that we set (ǔ1 b1, ǔ2 b2) as the strategies to share the spectrum, the price is 
lower, and the total profit will increase. Now, let us suppose the SU u1 deviates from the 
optimal solution. The strategy of SU u2 does not change. SU u1 adopts the strategy based on 
the marginal profit function. The profit for the two SUs will change when SU u1 deviated. 
The comparison of the individual profit in cooperative model, competitive model and 
deviation is shown in Figure 4. The total profit for the SUs is shown in Figure 5. γ1 is a 
variable, which changes in the range of 8~11dB, γ2 =12dB. 
It can be seen that µ1, µ2 are bigger in the cooperative model, compared with the competitive 
model. Therefore, the total profit is bigger too in the cooperative model. When SU u1 
deviates from the cooperative state, µ1 is higher, and µ2 is lower, and the total profit is lower 
(i.e. the amount of µ1 increasing is smaller than that of µ2 decreasing) as well. 
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Fig. 4. Total profit with different modes. 
 
 
Fig. 5. User Profit with different modes. 
6.1.3 Dynamic spectrum sharing game 
The pervious results were based on the two SUs. The analyzing method is similar for more 
SUs. In practice, the number of SUs may change. For example, there is another secondary 
user denoted by u3 looking to apply for the offered spectrum. We assume that the channel 
quality for u3 is the same with secondary user u2 (γ1 is a variable, γ2=γ3 =12dB). There is no 
more free spectrum for the primary user to share with others. The previously mentioned 
adaptive method is applied in the allocation of spectrum. First u1 and u2 exit a fixed ratio of 
spectrum to u3, and the total profit is computed. If the total profit could increase, the process 
will go on. If the total profit decreases, the SU with a better channel state will stop the 
process of exit. The trajectory of the process is shown in Figure 6. In addition, the 
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corresponding total profit is shown in Figure 6-7. When a new SU applies for spectrum 
sharing, it would converge to the point of (3.418948, 5.4642, 0.4936). The total profit is 
62.3421, which is a little bigger than the case with two SUs. When the third SU exits the 
spectrum, an adaptive method is applied to reallocate the spectrum. The left two SUs 
converge to (2.2148, 5.9393) with a total profit of 73.9867, as shown in Figure 6-8. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Spectrum sharing in dynamic game. 
 
Fig. 7. Dynamic game and user profit. 
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Fig. 8. Spectrum Share when user retreats. 
7. Is the cooperative game visible? 
So far we have discussed three game models to solve the problem of spectrum sharing in CR 
systems. We proved that the optimal game would improve the overall profit of the players 
in the game, which might lead to unfair distribution of the offered spectrum. The 
competitive game shows a lower overall profit, but gives a better share to the user with 
better channel quality, who ask for a share earlier and stays active for longer period (i.e., a 
higher priority as compared to new comers). Finally, the cooperative game gives the best 
overall individual profit and it is the best way to insure a fair share between multiple users 
in any CR system. However, does the cooperative game model works in an actual CR 
system? 
In practical CR environment, the communication between competitors (i.e., players) is very 
hard to achieve. Individual users tend to contact the PU and ask for service [49], users can 
only observe the pricing function form the PU, but not the strategies and profits of other 
users. Nevertheless, achieving a cooperative scheme between the SUs (either, the PU forces 
the SU to get a fair share or using the model mentioned earlier) would improve both the 
seller and users revenue. Let us use the same assumption used in the previous section, 
where a PU have a 30MHz of free spectrum to offer to a group of users. The cooperative 
mode will work when the number of players is relatively small, so each player can discuss a 
fair share with the rest of the players. However, when the number of SUs increases, let say 
20 or more SUs, the cooperative mode will not be useful anymore. If the PU or the users in 
such a scenario would decide to use the cooperative mode, the individual profit and share 
will be very low as compared to competitive game, taking into account the channel quality, 
user need and priority. 
In order to solve such a problem, two solutions are proposed in the following sections. 
Firstly, a second-price pay-to-bid (or sometimes called as pay-as-bid) sealed auction 
mechanism is introduced to insure a fair competitive game between SUs. Secondly, 
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reputation-based auction game is introduced as non-cooperative game to assign a SU to be a 
secondary-PU between other SUs. More details in the following sections: 
7.1 Pay-to-Bid competitive auction 
The allocation mechanism works as follows, let W= [w1, w2, …, wn] be the non-negative bids 
(i.e., user valuation) that the SU will pay in order to get a share of the offered spectrum and 
let X= [x1, x2, …., xn] be the  amount of the spectrum per unit bandwidth they are allocated 
as a result. We assume that the PU will announce the auction per unit bandwidth, for 
example the SUs will offer a bid for every 1MHz they will be allocated. 
This allocation is made according to a cost-based allocation mechanism τ, so that with the 
given payment w, the allocation to SU i is given by xi = Ǖi (w), as shown in Figure 6-9. c will 
be assumed to be the reserved price of the PU, any SU bidding less than that will be 
withdrawn from the auction. 
In order to reflect user i‘s valuation of the offered spectrum, a simple valuation function is 
proposed: 
 vi = Is × upi  (18) 
Where vi is user i‘s valuation to the offered spectrum per unit bandwidth, and upi defines 
how much the user needs to get the desired share of the spectrum, which is a function of 
user traffic priority (tpi) and the channel SNR (γi); 
 upi= tpi × γi  (19) 
 
Fig. 9. Pay-to-bid allocation mechanism. 
The user valuation can be interpreted that user i uses the importance of his traffic and the 
channel quality (already known to all users) as a ruler to set his bid in the auction. This 
valuation measures the SU (if he wins the auction) capabilities to bid more for the offered 
spectrum keeping in mind the capacity of his channel. We can see that when the channel 
condition is good (according to equation (3)), the user will be more willing to increase his 
bid. As a result, a higher bid would be expected from him/her and vice versa. 
We must mention that the auction mechanism is designed in such a way that vi does not 
represent the real price that an SU has to pay during the auction. Simply it is an 
interpretation of the strategic situation that a node is facing. In fact vi reflects the 
relationship between the user valuation and the channel condition. Additionally, since the 
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channel coefficient k is a random variable with a known distribution to each user, the 
distribution of the valuation vi is also known (according to their relationship shown in 
equation (16)). This means that vi lies in the interval [vmin, vmax]. We defined Bid as the bid 
space in the auction, {bid1, bid2, …, bidN}, which represent the set of possible bids submitted 
to the PU. We can simply assign bid0 to zero without loss of generality, as it represents the 
null bid. Accordingly, bid1 is the lowest acceptable bid, and bidN is the highest bid. The bid 
increment between two adjacent bids is taken to be the same in the typical case. In the event 
of ties (i.e. two bidders offer the same final price), the object would be allocated randomly to 
one of the tied bidders. 
To find the winner of the first-price sealed-bid pay-to-bid auction, a theoretical model is 
defined based on the work of [52]. The probability of detecting a bid bidi is denoted as ξ1, the 
probability of not participating in the named auction will be denoted as ξ0. Then the vector ξ, 
which equals to (ξ1, ξ2, …., ξN), denotes the probability distribution over Bid, where ( ∑ 0Ni=  ξi = 
1). Now we introduce the cumulative distribution function, which is used to find out 
whether a user i will bid with bidi or less, ∑ 0ij=  ξj = ξ, all of them are collected in the vector ξ. 
Then, any rational potential bidder with a known valuation of vi faces a decision problem of 
maximizing his expected profit from winning the auction; i.e.; 
( ) ( | )
i
max
bid Bid i i iv bid Pr winning bid< ∈ > −  (20) 
The equilibrium probability of winning for a particular bid bi is denoted as ǉi, and these 
probabilities are collected in ϑ, (ϑ0, ϑ1, ϑ2, … , ϑn). Using ξ, the elements of the vector ϑ can be 
calculated. We can easily find that ϑ0 is known to be zero, as if any bidder submitted a null 
bid to the source, he is not going to win. We can calculate the remanning elements of  ϑ as it 
can be directly verified that the following constitute a symmetric, Bayes-Nash equilibrium [53] 
of the auction game: 
 1
1
   0,1,2,...,
( )
n n
i i
i n n
i i
i n
n
ξ ξϕ ξ ξ
−
−
−= ∀ =−  (21) 
We used the notation of Bayes-Nash equilibrium as defined in [53], there approach is to 
transform a game of incomplete information into one of imperfect information, and any 
buyer who has incomplete information about other buyers’ values is treated as if he were 
uncertain about their types. From equation (21), we can see that the numerator is the 
probability that the highest bid is exactly equal to bidi, while the denominator is the expected 
number of users how are going to submit the same bid (i.e., bidi). For any user in the game, 
the best response will be to submit a bid which satisfies the following inequality; 
( ) ( )            i i i j j jv bid v bid j iϑ ϑ− ≥ − ∀ ≠  
The above inequality shows that user i‘s profit is weakly beat any other user j‘s profit. The 
above inequality is the discrete analogue to the equilibrium first-order condition for 
expected-profit maximization in the continuous-variation model [52], which takes the form 
of the following ordinary differential equation in the strategy function Ø(vi); 
 
, ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i i
i i i
i i
n f v n f v
Ø v Ø v v
F v F v
− −+ =  (22) 
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Where f(vi) and F(vi) are the probability density and cumulative distribution function of each 
bidder valuation respectively. We assume that they are common knowledge to bidders 
along with n, the number of bidders in the system. The reserve price is denoted by c, (In 
many instance, sellers reserve the right not to sell the object if the price determined in the 
auction is lower than some threshold amount [53], say c > 0), and the above differential 
equation has the following solution; 
 
1
1
( )
( )
( )
iv n
r
i i n
i
F u du
Ø v v
F v
−
−= −
∫
 (23) 
In the case of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the bidder i will submit a bid of bidi = Ø(vi) in 
equilibrium and he will pay a proportional price to his bid if he wins. On the other hand, for 
the second-price sealed-bid auction, a user I will submit his valuation truthfully. This is 
because the price a user has to pay if he wins the auction is not the winning bid but the 
second highest one. Therefore, there is nothing to drive a user to bid higher or lower than 
his true valuation to the data offered by the server. In this case, bidi = vi, shown in equation 
(18), and the payment process is the same as in the first-price auction. Once the winner has 
been announced, the PU will send an update message to all the SUs with the second highest 
price they need to pay in order to gain access. All SUs must pay the winning bid per unit 
bandwidth. To insure that the winner will get a higher priority than the rest of competitors, 
PU will send the winning bid to everyone and treat their replies according to the first bid 
was offered by the SUs in the first place. 
This mechanism will offer a better competition in terms of fairness between players, the user 
with a better channel quality, a higher priority traffic and honest valuation will get a much 
better chance than other users to gain access to his/her desired share. Moreover, the named 
mechanism will improve the seller and winners revenue as compared to the optimal and 
cooperative game models. 
Finally, next we will test the named mechanism with similar scenario assumptions as in the 
previous section. We are comparing three models; first, when the spectrum is offered to the 
users using a cooperative game. Second, using a similar setting but with a competitive game 
and finally a competitive second-price pay-to-bid sealed auction. We will study the effects in 
two simple scenarios; one, a SU (named u1) who is competing with other bidders to get a 
share of the spectrum since the PU announce the auction. Two, a new comer is joining the 
game (the newcomer will join the game as the eleventh user onward) and how the 
introduced mechanism will improve his/her revenue, taking into account that the new 
comer has an excellent channel quality and a fair bid. 
Figure 10, proofs what we discussed in section 6.1.3 in terms of individual user revenue. 
Although the cooperative games shows a better start (i.e., when the number of bidders is 
low), the cooperative game tries to improve the player’s revenue and keep a fair share 
between all bidders. This would cause a sharp decrease in the seller revenue when the 
number of bidders increases. On the other the competitive game takes into account the 
channel condition and the user ability to grab his/her share before the others, that’s why it 
shows better revenue when compared to the cooperative model.  
For the second scenario, Figure 11 shows the dramatic improvement in the newcomer 
revenue; keeping in mind that his/her priority is rather high. Clearly, the introduced 
mechanism helped in improving spectrum share in terms of fairness, massively improving 
the players’ revenue when compared to the other models and gives the PU a better deal by 
using the second-price sealed-auction. 
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Fig. 10. SU revenue vs. number of users with different models. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Newcomer revenue vs. number of users. 
7.2 Reputation-based non-cooperative auction games 
With this game, PU will assign the spectrum to the winner of the second-price sealed 
auction process. The revenue of the PU will not change, as using the second-price auction 
insures that all bidders will bid around the real value of the offered spectrum. The winner of 
the auction will be a new PU between the rest of the SUs, and will have the right to decide 
whether to share the spectrum with the rest or not. However, a penalty factor is introduced 
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to insure that not only paying more will guarantee a share of the spectrum but also 
reputation will be combined with each bid. This factor will be forwarded to the PU and will 
show whether the winner of the last auction was popular or not, which is done by helping 
other SUs to share the offered spectrum. 
In this section we will represent the infinitely repeated version of game G by G∞ (i.e. this is 
the case when G is going to be played over and over again in successive time periods). We are 
assuming that the PU is offering a single frequency band to be shared by other SU’s. 
However, if the PU is planning to offer more bands then the proposed mechanism must be 
repeated for the other bands between the secondary users. We will define the user 
reputation as R which will depends on user performance during any time period t as well as 
in prior time periods. Reputation of player i in some time period t is denoted by itR . 
Formally, we define node reputation as follows: 
 1(1 )     0 1,     2
i i
t tR R w t−= − ∝ + ×∝ ≤∝≤ ≥   (24) 
Where ∝ is the history of the user, it depends on the user reputation in the previous periods 
according to user behaviour. “w” is equal to “1” when player i at time t is interested in 
sharing the offered spectrum and “0” otherwise. Therefore, 0 ≤ itR  ≤ 1, i.e. the reputation 
value of each player varies between “0” and “1” (including) ( itR ∈[0,1]). Moreover, the 
reputation value of all players is equal to “0” when t = 0. A high value of ∝ means the more 
importance is assigned to a player’s need in sharing the spectrum with the PU (higher 
priority) during the current period than its previous need record, and vice versa. Thus, 
when ∝ is high, a user with even low reputation value in the current time period t, can 
significantly improve his/her reputation when it realises that it needs a better share of the 
spectrum. 
As was defined the Nash equilibrium case earlier, the evaluation of the Nash equilibrium of 
the repeated game G∞ will be engaged. By finding the Nash equilibrium of G∞ it leads to the 
deduction of the Nash equilibria of G. The proposed incentive mechanism is based on a 
player’s links reputation R. The benefit of which is that a player draws from the system to its 
contribution, the benefit is a monotonically increasing function of a player’s contribution. 
Thus, this is a non-cooperative game among the players, where each player with high 
priority traffic wants to maximize his/her utility. The classical concept of Nash equilibrium 
points a way out of the endless cycle of speculation and counter-speculation as to what 
strategies the players should use. The intent is to deduce a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
because all the players belong to the same population/network (i.e., assume the same role) 
and it is therefore easier (i.e., require no coordination among players) to achieve such an 
equilibrium. If the players in a game either do not differ significantly or are not aware of any 
differences among themselves (i.e., if they are drawn from a single homogeneous 
population) then it is difficult for them to coordinate and a symmetric equilibrium, in which 
every player uses the same strategy, is more compelling. 
The argument of a single homogeneous population implies that all the peers in a CR 
network have equivalent responsibilities and capabilities as everybody else. We assume that 
if the player chooses the action {want to share}, this will assign him a probability of p, and if 
the player chooses the action {does not want to share}, this will assign one a probability of  
1 - p. 
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It must be mentioned that in the action profile, a time and money saving Nash equilibrium 
case is defined, if all players choose the action {does not want to share}. As this will mean that, 
players are not interested in sharing the spectrum for the entire communication time. That is 
to say, users have low priority traffic and accessing the spectrum will be by chance, players 
will not compete to send their data and will not offer more money to the PU to get the 
spectrum. If any other player i decided to switch to the action {want to share}, its payoff will 
be – C which is less than a payoff of “0” that the node gets when decided not to share the 
spectrum. An undesirable Nash equilibrium case is generated, if all the players choose the 
action {want to share}. This is easy to see because all nodes will have to compete against each 
other again, this will waste time and the winner will be the PU, as one of the SU’s should 
pay more to share the offered spectrum. 
The expected payoff of any player in period t when it selects the action {want to share} is:  
 ( )sharetp C R U− + ×   (25) 
This payoff is denoted as Payoffshare, U is the nodes utility. Similarly, the payoff for any 
player selects the action {does not want to share} will be: 
 (1 )( )dontsharetp R U− ×   (26) 
This will be denoted as payoffdon’tshare. It is easy to show that the term 
share
tR U×  captures the 
notation that the probability of SU becoming a secondary PU by sharing the offered 
spectrum is directly proportional to node’s reputation. 
share
tR  is player i reputation when he/she wants to share the offered spectrum at time t (i.e. 
w = 1 in equation (24)), and  'don tsharetR  is player i reputation when he/she decides to take the 
action {does not want to share} at the same time period t (i.e. w = 0 in equation (24)), from 
equation (24), we can get: 
1(1 )
share
t tR R −= − ∝ + ∝  
and 
 1(1 )
dontshare
t tR R −= − ∝   (27) 
Generally, each player’s expected payoff in equilibrium is his/her expected payoff to any of 
its actions that he/she uses with positive probability. The above useful characterization of 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium yields to: 
 payoffshare = payoffdon’tshare  (28) 
Using equations 6-25, 6-26, and 6-27; 
 1 1( ( (1 ) ) ) (1 )( (1 ) )t tp C R U p R U− −− + − ∝ + ∝ × = − − ∝ ×  (29) 
Solving equation 9 to get the final value of p; 
 1
1
(1 )
2 (1 )
t
t
R U
p
C R U U
−
−
× × − ∝= − + × × − ∝ + ×∝  (30) 
www.intechopen.com
Auction and Game-Based Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks   
 
33 
It must be mentioned that the value p obtained above is not a constant, but varies in each 
time interval depending upon a node’s reputation at the end of the previous time interval  
t -1. 
Finally, the mixed strategy pair (p, 1 – p) for actions { want to share, does not want to share} 
respectively, is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the players (i.e. nodes in the network). 
Assuming no collusion among nodes, if all the other nodes follow the above strategy, then 
the best strategy for any node is to also to follow one of the above strategies. Actually, this is 
a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for any G, as well as G∞. In fact, it is a more 
stable equilibrium than the one in which no node is interested in sharing the offered 
spectrum. This is caused by two reasons. First, when none of the SUs is interested in sharing 
the spectrum, the network is not useful to any user. Second, in real-time scenarios, users that 
derive finite utility from altruism would always send some messages irrespective of how 
much they obtain in return. Therefore, it is unlikely to have a scenario in which no node is 
looking to contact the PU to share the spectrum. 
7.3 Properties of the proposed Nash Equilibrium 
In this section, we will present some of the interesting properties of the Nash equilibrium 
derived in the section above 
7.3.1 Simplicity of calculating the Nash Equilibrium  
In section ‘6.7.2’, we have calculated the probability of achieving the equilibrium point 
between the SUs. This was based on which node will decide to share the spectrum with the 
PU and become a secondary PU. In each round of the game (or time period t) players decide 
whether they should ask to share the offered spectrum or not, based on their reputation at 
the end of the prior time period. This probability, as one can see, does not remain constant 
from one period to another. Moreover, it depends on a player’s reputation at the end of the 
last time period. Players can calculate their reputation using equation (24), since they know 
precisely their actions at each round of the game. Thus, determining the Nash equilibrium 
strategy is fairly straightforward for any player.  However, it must be noted that there is an 
inherent assumption that nodes are serviced based on their current reputation. 
Figure 12, shows how players’ reputations change in every time interval depending on their 
Nash strategy. At the beginning of the communication time, both, player 1 and 2 are 
competing with each other to guarantee access to the offered spectrum. However, player 1 
uses the spectrum but at the same time managed to help player 2 (i.e. player 1 will be the 
secondary PU and will manage the access of players 2 and 3 to the offered spectrum). Player 
3 shows his interest in the offered spectrum after the third time interval, and managed to 
use the spectrum once both player 1 and 2 finished using it or they are not interested 
anymore in sharing it. The figure shows the players (nodes) reputation values 0 ≤ itR  ≤ 1 
over ten time intervals. 
On the other hand, Figure 13 below shows the same result but over a longer time period, 
around nine hundred time intervals. Similarly, three nodes are competing with each other, 
player one with the highest reputation and player three with the lowest. Player 1 will act as 
the secondary PU over the other two users (i.e. player 2 and 3). In this figure we used a 
random matrix generator to show different reputations when player 1 is interested to share 
the spectrum for 80% of the time, player 2 for 50% of the time and player 3 for 8% of the 
time only. 
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Fig. 12. Change in player’s reputation controlled by their Nash equilibrium strategies. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Changing player reputation over a longer time period. 
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7.3.2 Addressing the spectrum to the right user 
The simple game theoretic model presented in the previous sections, wherein node 
reputation is used as a basis for deciding who will share the offered spectrum, predicts that 
it is in every peer’s best interest to serve others. This includes the nodes that are not 
interested to share the spectrum at the current time period. Our simulations support this 
behaviour as we found that the total service received by a node is balanced by the total 
service that it has to offer to others, as shown in Figure 12. 
7.3.3 Addressing the problem of competitive sharing 
An important property of the equilibrium emerges from equation (30) that predicts the 
probability with which one node will be a secondary PU and it should serve others. If we set 
the value of C in away such that, C <<< U (i.e. C can be ignored from equation (6-30)), then 
equation (6-30) becomes: 
 1
1
(1 )
2 (1 )
t
t
R
p
R
−
−
− ∝= − ∝ + ∝  (31) 
That would lead us to the conclusion that p < 0.5. Then, Nash equilibrium of the proposed 
game predicts that players should help each other less than 50 percent of the time when PU 
offers the spectrum. This, although it appears to be very restrictive, is a consequence of the 
fact that all nodes are selfish and are better off trying to share the spectrum than serving 
others. Intuitively, if a node knows that everyone else in the network behaves selfishly, i.e., 
provide as little service as possible, then the best strategy for the named node cannot be to 
serve others most of the time (i.e., with probability greater than 0.5). 
7.3.4 Fairness and equal sharing of cost and spectrum 
We concluded from the previous section that serving with a priority of less than 50 percent 
(i.e. when C <<< U) is an optimal point, the observer can notice that the overall system 
efficiency is severely reduced. This is because most of the nodes in the network act selfishly 
and at least half of the service requests from other nodes are not fulfilled. On the other hand, 
this equilibrium strategy provides fairness in the sense that the cost of system inefficiency is 
not burn by a single node (i.e. has one positive side), but it is shared among all nodes. This is 
because each node’s request is likely to be turned down by the serving node (i.e. selfish 
secondary PU). In this work, we assume that if a node’s request at one node is turned down, 
the node tries at some other candidate node capable of serving the request. On average, the 
probability that a node’s request is successfully served in a time period is proportional to its 
current reputation. 
7.3.5 Decreasing α for a better share of the spectrum 
Figure 14 shows the effects of ∝ on the reputation probability of the nodes in the case where 
the node is not interested in sharing the spectrum. On the other hand, the node in figure 15 
is looking to keep its share of the spectrum (derived from equation (27)). 
As can be seen from Figures 14 and 15, a lower value of α shifts the reputation probability 
curve upwards. However, that all depends on whether the node is interested in using the 
offered spectrum or not. If the node is looking to give its share of the spectrum to other 
nodes, a low value of ∝ will gradually help the node to lose its share, however a high value 
of ∝ will guarantee a faster release of the spectrum. This is true for Figure 15 as well, which 
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Fig. 14. Players reputation with respect to α and the node is not interested in sharing the 
offered spectrum. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Players reputation with respect to α and the node is definitely interested in sharing 
the offered spectrum from the PU. 
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is to be expected since ∝ determines how much importance is given to a node’s current 
performance as compared to its past service record. A low value of ∝ (i.e., giving more 
importance to nodes past actions up to the current time period t) means that nodes need to 
continually provide service to be able to maintain high reputation and access spectrum 
offered from the PU. If however ∝ is high, nodes can easily increase their reputation in any 
period in which they provide service to other nodes. This is irrespective of how cooperative 
they have been in the past with regards to providing service to others. Therefore a simple 
way to improve the system efficiency is to set ∝ as low as possible. 
8. Summery 
Cognitive radio is regarded as the key technology for next generation of wireless network. 
Dynamic spectrum sharing is one of the most important problems related to Cognitive 
Radio networks. Based on the competitive spectrum sharing on game theory, an adaptive 
competitive game and auction-based spectrum sharing mechanism is presented in this 
chapter. The advantages over the optimal, cooperative and competitive modes have been 
proved by simulation. A general solution for the instability problem has been proposed and 
an adaptive method is used for the changing number of secondary users by using 
cooperative game model when the number of users is small. Another solution to such a 
problem is presented by using a non-cooperative game model combined with second-price 
auction to choose a secondary primary user. The decision is based on user reputation and 
user’s valuation of the offered spectrum. We have the solution with maximum total profit 
and better fairness in spectrum sharing. We have discussed how the increase of competitors 
would affects the fairness of spectrum sharing and proved that the proposed mechanism 
offers better revenue to the seller and the bidders in terms of fairness.    
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